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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The city did not dispute that majority of jurisdictions 
consider the HGN test to be scientific evidence. The city admitted 
that the HGN test is based on scientific principles. The city 
admitted that Officer Warner did not give any testimony as to the 
scientific principles underlying the HGN test. Warner admitted 
lacking any knowledge regarding the principles underlying the HGN 
test and even could not say whether the Salt Lake Police Department 
used the HGN test regularly. Warner used no equipment to ensure 
accurate measurements. The observations he says he made that night 
on a busy street without equipment cannot be verified or 
duplicated. 
The trial court found, based upon the officer's testimony, 
that the officer was unable to lay a foundation as to either 
general acceptance or inherent reliability. The court also found 
there was no basis for taking judicial notice of the reliability of 
the test. The court instructed the jury that no evidence 
establishing the reliability of the test had been admitted. The 
admission of the HGN testimony under these circumstances was error 
creating a reasonable probability of prejudice. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE CITY'S BRIEF SUPPORTS FINDING THAT THE 
HGN TEST RESULT IS SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 
A. The City failed to support its contention 
that HGN is not scientific evidence 
The city did not dispute Ms. Garcia's assertion that the 
majority of the jurisdictions considering the admissibility of 
horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test results have found the test to 
be scientific evidence. In fact, in its Brief, the city related 
cases from several jurisdictions that support finding HGN to be 
scientific evidence.1 
The city nevertheless asserted that "HGN is not a scientific 
test within the meaning of Utah law." City's Brief (CB) , pl3 . The 
minimal authority cited by the city on this point does not support 
its contention. For example, the city cited State v. Bresson, 554 
N.E.2d 1330 (Ohio 1990) . The city noted that the Bresson court 
allowed HGN testimony based only on the testimony of the officer 
1
 See City's Brief (CB), pp 16-17, citing State v. Witte, 836 
P.2d 1110, 1116 (Kan. 1992) (HGN "exceeds common knowledge") ; State 
v. Superior Court, 718 P.2d 171 (Ariz. 1986) (HGN outside common 
knowledge); Commonwealth v. Miller, 532 A.2d 1186 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1987) (HGN is scientific evidence because it is based on the 
scientific principle that HGN is caused by alcohol consumption); 
State v. Reed, 732 P.2d 66, 68 (Ore. App. 1986) (stating that, 
unlike other field sobriety tests which elicit "reactions to 
alcohol that are so common that we take judicial notice of them," 
HGN draws its convincing force from scientific principles.). 
2 
administering the test. CB, pl7. 
The city, however, did not disclose the limitations the court 
placed on that testimony. The Bresson court declined to allow the 
officer to testify about any blood alcohol content indicated by the 
HGN test because of due process difficulties, including: (1) the 
officer's reading of the HGN test cannot be verified or duplicated 
by an independent party, (2) the test's recognized margin of error 
creates a problem in criminal cases which require proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, (3) the circumstances under which the test is 
administered at roadside may affect the reliability of the result, 
and (4) nystagmus is caused conditions other than alcohol 
consumption. Bresson, 554 N.E.2d at 1336.2 
The City also cited State v. Gilbert, 751 S.W.2d 454 (Tenn. 
Ct. App. 1988) in support of its assertion that HGN is not a 
scientific test. CB, pl5. The city noted that the Gilbert court 
stated that field tests are not "scientific tests." See id. The 
city neglected to reveal, however, that the Gilbert case never 
considers the question of whether the HGN test is scientific 
evidence, nor does the court at any time even mention the HGN test. 
The city also cites State v. Murphy, 451 N.W.2d 154 (Iowa 
1990). CB, pl8. It should be noted that Iowa has adopted a 
2
 Moreover, to the extent applicable at all, Appellant asserts 
that the Bresson court's analysis is faulty. The court indicated 
its belief that the HGN test does not require any special 
foundation because, unlike the polygraph test, no special equipment 
is required. First, Appellant would argue that, if HGN is used at 
all, special equipment must be used to ensure accurate measurement. 
Second, the Bresson court overlooks the fact that mere measurement 
of observable phenomena is but one part of the necessary foundation 
for scientific evidence. See Discussion at II.C. infra. 
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particularly "liberal approach to the admissibility of technical 
information." Murphy, 451 N.W.2d at 157. The city overlooks the 
fact that Utah's evidentiary requirements for scientific evidence 
are most restrictive than those of the jurisdictions it cites. See 
Discussion at II.A. infra. 
B. The city's own analytical framework 
supports finding that HGN is scientific 
evidence 
The city's own analytical framework declares that HGN is 
scientific evidence. The city conceded that "[t]he way HGN 
operates at a physiological level is based on scientific 
principles." CB, pll. The city also suggests that " [r] ef erence to 
natural laws of science is an appropriate benchmark." CB, pl5. In 
this regard, "the City acknowledge [d] that the source of HGN is 
within the natural sciences." CB, pl5. Therefore, given that the 
city does not dispute that the majority of jurisdictions have held 
that HGN is scientific evidence, and because the city's own 
analytical framework suggests that the source of HGN is within the 
natural sciences, this court should hold that HGN is scientific 
evidence. 
II. THE CITY INCORRECTLY ATTEMPTS TO SET FORTH 
RULE 702 AS THE APPROPRIATE FOUNDATIONAL 
REQUIREMENT FOR SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 
A. Rule 702 is not the test for scientific 
evidence 
The City's brief is permeated with references to Rule 702. 
See, eg., CB, pp 14, 16, 18, 20, 27, & 28. The City's reliance on 
4 
rule 702 is misplaced. The Utah Supreme Court has explained that 
Rule 702 is not the correct standard for the admissibility of 
scientific evidence. The Court determined that the test for 
admissibility of scientific evidence is more restrictive than for 
expert evidence generally. The Court has made it clear that 
"regardless of how rule 702 phrases the general test for the 
admissibility of expert testimony, our case law superimposes a more 
restrictive test whenever scientific evidence is at issue." 
Rimmasch, 775 P. 2d at 397. That test is the inherent reliability 
requirement announced in Phillips. Id. 
B. The city's analogies of HGN to other 
evidence that might be admissible under 
Rule 702 is are inapposite 
In response to Appellant's claim that the HGN test is 
scientific evidence the City complains that "all knowledge that is 
outside common knowledge and experience is not necessarily 
scientific." CB, pl4. The City then presents, (without any 
authority, detail or analysis) , several inapposite examples of 
testimony that might be admissible under Rule 702, but which would 
be unlikely candidates for compliance with Rimmasch. The city 
presents these examples: (1) a carpenter's testimony regarding 
building techniques, CB, pl4; (2) a truck driver's testimony 
regarding industry standards CB, pl4; (3) testimony that gunpowder 
causes projectiles to be propelled, CB, pl8; and (4) the comparison 
of shoeprints, CB, p29. 
The city's "straw man" examples are easily distinguishable, 
5 
of course. Who would argue that a carpenter could not testify 
about building techniques?; what court would require a Rimmasch 
foundation before allowing a truck driver to testify about how many 
pounds he can haul?; is there anyone who would argue that gunpowder 
does not propel bullets?; is it beyond the ability of lay jurors to 
understand evidence that two shoeprints look the same? 
The city's examples are plainly irrelevant. Appellant never 
sought to have the court require compliance with Rimmasch for all 
testimony that is not common knowledge. The fact that these 
examples from Rule 702 are so easily distinguishable from HGN 
evidence actually supports the notion that HGN requires more 
foundation. 
C. The city's attempt to distinguish Kofford 
and Rimmasch is misguided 
The city's attempt to distinguish Kofford v. Flora, 744 P.2d 
11343 (Utah 1987) , is faulty. The city argues that because HGN 
does not require chemicals or a microscope like the human leucocyte 
antigen (HLA) test, that it is not scientific evidence. CB, pp 24-
25. The city's comparison is defective. The observation of a 
phenomenon is only one part of the foundation required in both HLA 
and HGN tests. After the HLA chemical results are mechanically 
observed, the proponent still must provide a foundation for 1) the 
correctness of the genetic principles underlying the test, 2) the 
accuracy and reliability of the methods used, 3) the effect of 
variables that would influence the accuracy of the test, 4) 
establishing that the actual method employed and the particular 
6 
test used in a given case were performed in accordance with proper 
procedures and with proper materials and equipment; and 6) the 
qualifications of the necessary witnesses. Phillips v. Jackson, 
615 P.2d 1228, 1235 (Utah 1980) . Like the HLA test, observation is 
only one aspect of the foundation necessary to a valid HGN test. 
At trial, Ms. Garcia suggested the following foundational 
requirements would be required in regards to HGN testimony: 
(1) that nystagmus of the eye is an inherently 
reliable indicator of an individual's blood alcohol 
level or ability to safely operate a motor vehicle; 
(2) that the 3-part HGN test performed by Warner is an 
inherently reliable means of measuring nystagmus of the 
eye, 
(3) that Warner properly performed the tests on this 
occasion, 
(4) that Warner was sufficiently qualified to testify 
as to the test's result. 
Tr. 14, citing Phillips v. Jackson, 615 P.2d 1228, 1235 (Utah 1980) 
and State v. Witte, 836 P.2d 1110, 1111, 1117 (Kan. 1992). 
Officer Warner's observations are only one part of the 
necessary foundation for HGN test results. Warner provided no 
testimony on the reliability of the principles or procedures. See 
CB, p20. Moreover, the test he performed on this occasion was 
fraught with fallibility. See CB, pp25-28. Thus, the city failed 
to establish the requisite foundation for the HGN evidence. 
The city also attempts to distinguish Rimmasch. CB, p25; see 
State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989) (testimony regarding 
sexual abuse victim profile requires foundation as to reliability). 
7 
It should be noted that the city's analytical basis for 
distinguishing Kofford and Phillips from HGN testing -- the 
necessity of chemicals and microscopes -- breaks down here. Surely 
the city would not argue that the answers and actions of a child 
victim cannot be observed without a microscope. 
In addition, as with parentage testing, observation of 
phenomenon is but one part of the necessary foundation for the 
testimony. The Rimmasch court rejected evidence from experts 
without a prior foundation of the reliability of the sexual abuse 
victim profile theory. Rimmasch, 775 P. 2d at 403. HGN evidence is 
similar because, in addition to the mere observation of a 
phenomenon (nystagmus), a foundation as the reliability of the 
underlying principle and the correct application of the principles 
in a particular case is necessary to ensure that there is a 
reliable basis for the testimony. 
III. OFFICER WARNER'S TESTIMONY PROVIDED 
INADEQUATE FOUNDATION FOR THE ADMISSION OF 
THE HGN TEST RESULTS 
Officer Warner's testimony was insufficient foundation for the 
HGN test because, among other things, he testified only to his 
personal observations. The city claimed that an "[e]xplanation of 
scientific principles underlying physical processes is not required 
for testimony based on personal observation." CB, pl3. As 
explained in section II.C., supra, personal observation is only one 
step of the foundation required for HGN as well as for other 
evidence based on scientific principles. 
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In addition, Warner's testimony provided little basis for 
establishing the reliability of HGN testing. The city suggests 
that Officer Warner could have qualified as an expert under Rule 
702. CB, p28. But Warner admitted to having no personal knowledge 
of the biomechanical processes by which alcohol ingestion 
supposedly produces nystagmus. Tr. 22. He published no articles 
nor any summaries of his findings for review; so his experiences 
cannot be verified or duplicated. Tr. 23. He did not know what 
the general opinion of the scientific community might be of the HGN 
test. Tr. 24. He could not even say whether the Salt Lake Police 
Department uses the test regularly. Tr. 20. The city admitted 
that Warner did not testify as to the principles underlying the HGN 
test. CB, pl2. 
After an evidentiary hearing, Judge Casey concluded that there 
was no basis for taking judicial notice of the reliability of the 
test. Tr. 35. Judge Casey took as stipulated the fact that Warner 
was not familiar enough with scientific literature or studies to 
discuss them professionally. Tr. 15, 16 LL 10-11. Finally, the 
judge found that Warner was unable to provide a foundation of 
either general acceptance or inherent reliability. Tr. 35-36. 
The city presented no expert testimony regarding the inherent 
reliability of the HGN test. The limited evidence presented at 
trial came from arresting officer Warner. Most courts have 
determined that police officers do not have the specialized 
scientific training to testify about the HGN test's scientific 
9 
reliability.3 In this case, Warner provided no testimony regarding 
the underlying principles of the test. This court should therefore 
find the "foundation" laid at trial to have been inadequate. 
IV. THE ADMISSION OF THE HGN RESULTS WITHOUT 
THE REQUIRED FOUNDATION OF RELIABILITY 
COMPOUNDS THE PREJUDICIAL EFFECT OF THE 
TESTIMONY 
A. The city's assertion that Warner's 
testimony was "not admitted as expert 
testimony" aggravates, rather than 
mitigates, the error 
The city's argument that "The HGN evidence did not mislead the 
jury because Officer Warner was not qualified before the jury as an 
expert witness," is thoroughly specious. See CB, pll. The city's 
view turns well-established rules of evidence upside down. 
Contrary to city's view, lack of foundation does not excuse the 
admission of the HGN test results, it aggravates the error! 
For example, according to the city's argument, if a court 
allowed testimony regarding paternity without the foundational 
requirements announced in Phillips, the court could avoid all 
prejudice simply by instructing the jury that "the witness was not 
testifying as an expert!" Or, a court could disregard Rimmasch and 
allow witnesses to testify about their opinion of the truthfulness 
of a sex crime victim without requiring any foundation of the 
reliability of the sexual abuse victim profile. 
Similarly, simply instructing the jury in the case at bar that 
3
 People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321, 334 (Cal. 1994) (en banc) 
(court agreed with "the weight of authority" that police officer 
testimony is insufficient to establish general acceptance). 
10 
Officer Warner was not testifying as an "expert" does not repair 
the damage. The bell was rung -- the jury heard his testimony. As 
the Rimmasch court noted, the rule requiring a foundation for 
evidence based on scientific principles is to guard against the 
danger of having the finder of fact simply "adopt the judgment of 
the expert despite an inability to accurately appraise the validity 
of the underlying science." Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 3 96.4 Because 
Officer Warner could not provide the jury with information to 
accurately appraise the validity of the science underlying the HGN 
test, Warner's testimony created a misleading aura of certainty. 
B. The city's assertion that Warner's 
testimony about Ms. Garcia's blood alcohol 
level did not prejudice her is simply 
sophistry 
Warner's testimony that Ms. Garcia exhibited the HGN cues that 
indicated a blood alcohol level over .10 prejudiced Ms. Garcia. 
The city argued that there was no prejudice because the city was 
not trying to prove she had a BAC over .08, but that she was 
"incapable of safely driving." CB, pl2. 
The city's argument is fallacious. Officer Warner did not 
testify that HGN tends to show a defendant is incapable of safely 
driving as the city pretends. Rather, Officer Warner testified 
that the HGN evidence indicated that Ms. Garcia had a blood alcohol 
content over the legal limit of .08. Specifically, Warner 
4
 See also State v. Merritt, 647 A.2d 1021, 1028 (Conn. App. 
1994) (stating that the mechanics of the HGN test, unlike those of 
other field sobriety tests, are not within the common knowledge of 
lay jurors and have the potential to mislead jurors). 
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testified that " [I]t's been my training and it's been my experience 
if nystagmus is present prior to 45 degrees in both eyes the 
person's BAC level, or blood alcohol content, is great, is at a .10 
or greater." Tr. 56. He then went on to state that nystagmus was 
present prior to 45 degrees in both of Ms. Garcia's eyes. Tr. 57. 
The city also attempted to downplay the effect of Warner's 
testimony by changing his words. The city characterized Warner's 
testimony as being that "an individual could test above a certain 
blood or breath alcohol percentage based on their performance on 
the HGN test." CB, p30 (emphasis added), citing Tr. 56. Warner's 
testimony, however, was unqualified. He stated that when all six 
HGN cues are present, the BAC "is at" .10 or greater. Tr. 56. 
In sum, the admission of HGN without any foundation regarding 
the underlying principles increases the prejudicial effect on the 
jury. The evidence becomes even more mysterious than if a 
foundational explanation were provided. Thus, absent adequate 
foundation, the jury is even more likely to rely on the testimony 
of the city's purported "expert". 
C. The city overstated the non-HGN evidence 
in its brief in an attempt to mitigate 
prejudice 
The city exaggerated the impact of the non-HGN evidence 
presented at trial. The city stated that the following evidence 
supports the conviction: the driving pattern, defendant's physical 
appearance, speech, lack of balance, odor of alcohol, poor 
performance, and refusal to take an Intoxilyzer test. See CB, p32. 
12 
The evidence referred to by the city is reviewed briefly below. 
Regarding Ms. Garcia's "driving pattern," Officer Warner 
testified that he observed no moving violations. Tr. 69-73. 
Regarding her "physical appearance," Officer Warner stated that Ms. 
Garcia appeared to be "pleasant and upbeat"; he noted that Ms. 
Garcia had red eyes but admitted that there are many causes of red 
eyes including allergy, fatigue, smoke and pollution. Tr. 75. 
Regarding Ms. Garcia's "speech," Officer Warner testified that she 
had normal (not slurred) speech. Tr. 49. Regarding Ms. Garcia's 
"balance, " Officer Warner noted only one time during all the field 
sobriety testing that Ms. Garcia lost her balance only once 
momentarily when he asked her to assume an abnormal posture--the 
"instructional stance." Tr. 59. Regarding an "odor of alcohol," 
Officer Warner testified that an odor of alcohol is not proof of 
impairment and that even sober individuals who have just taken a 
drink can have an odor of alcohol on their breath. Tr. 73-74. 
Regarding Ms. Garcia's supposedly "poor performance" on the 
field sobriety tests, Officer Williams stated that he thought there 
was one test she could not do but did not remember which one it 
was. Tr. 97. Officer Warner admitted that Ms. Garcia's almost 
perfect performance on the finger count test was not poor. Tr. 83. 
Ms. Garcia also performed well on the "Walk and Turn" test. 
Tr. 59. Ms. Garcia was asked to walk nine steps in a line, heel to 
toe, with her hands at her sides, to watch her feet while walking 
and count each step out loud, then to rotate and wake nine more 
steps heel to toe back. Tr. 60. Ms. Garcia complained of an ankle 
13 
injury but attempted to complete the test as asked. Tr. 76. Ms. 
Garcia correctly walked nine steps, stayed on a straight line, did 
not start too soon or stop to steady herself, was able to complete 
the nine steps without using her arms to balance, and touched heel 
to toe on all but the 6th step. Tr. 76-80. Then she paused, 
turned and asked Warner to clarify the directions for completing 
the test. Tr. 80. Warner failed Ms. Garcia, not for performing 
poorly, but merely for asking directions for completing the 
multiphase test. Tr. 80. 
Regarding Ms. Garcia's "refusal," not only had she already 
taken one breath test, she knew that her license was already 
suspended. Tr. 90. Thus, evidence of her refusal to take the 
second test in this case is not particularly probative. 
Of course, the first test performed on Ms. Garcia was the HGN 
test. Warner testified that based on his experience the HGN test 
indicated that Ms. Garcia had a blood alcohol level of .10 or 
higher. Tr. 56; see also Tr. 21, 28. Thus, the HGN evidence could 
have been sufficient in itself for the jury to find Ms. Garcia 
guilty as charged. 
CONCLUSION 
The admission of the HGN testimony at trial without a 
foundation as to the reliability of the test was error creating a 
reasonable probability of prejudice. Therefore, Ms. Garcia asks 
this court: (1) to find that the HGN test is scientific evidence 
subject to a preliminary determination by the trial court as to 
14 
whether the evidence meets Utah's inherent reliability test, (2) to 
find that the HGN testimony was erroneously admitted in this case, 
and (3) to reverse and remand for a new trial, 
DATED this ^ ^ day of November, 1995. 
RALPH DELLAPIANA 
Attorney for Appellant 
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